After the rejection of the arbitration clause, the other party can either accept the refusal, which means that the compromise clause no longer has any effect, or refuse the refusal, which means that the compromise clause will be confirmed. Nor did the court accept Hualon`s argument that he would not have considered rejecting the arbitration agreement by initiating legal proceedings, as he had only been aware of the arbitration agreement late. The party`s lack of knowledge of an arbitration agreement was subjective – an objective party left another reason to believe that the party who initiated legal proceedings did so because it no longer wanted to be bound by the compromise clause. In any event, the Tribunal was satisfied that Hualon did have real knowledge of the arbitration agreement. In 2015, after various stages in the BVI action, but before it was dismissed, Hualon (by the beneficiary) commenced arbitration proceedings against Marty, pursuant to an arbitration agreement established in the social charter of the Vietnamese subsidiary (the ”Charter”). The charges against Marty were essentially the same as in BVI`s complaint. Marty unsuccessfully denied the court`s jurisdiction in court and in the High Court. These decisions were overturned by the Court of Appeal. The presumption of the Court of Appeal, even if obitere, seems to place Singapore`s arbitration right on a different basis than English arbitration law.

The Court departed from the previous Singapore authorities and English (the explanatory statement of the principal rederi in English Kommanditselskaabet Merc-Scandia IV/Couniniotis SA [1980] 2 Lloyds Rep 183, ”thin”) and the views expressed in the main textbooks (English) De Chitty on Contracts, in which it is said that ”the use of legal proceedings [does not] constitute a rejection of the arbitration agreement” (33rd edition, point 32-051) and Russell on arbitration, which (24th edition, points 2 to 137) states that: arbitration preceded the BVI procedure in parallel with the BVI procedure. A single arbitral tribunal had been formed, Marty Ltd challenged the jurisdiction of the court and, in April 2016, the court decided that it had jurisdiction over the dispute. In May 2016, Marty Ltd opened proceedings in the Singapore Supreme Court to challenge the Decision of the Court of Arbitration, arguing that Hualon`s commencement and conduct in the BVI dispute had done so in violation of the arbitration agreement and that he was therefore no longer entitled to pursue arbitration. In early March 2015, Hualon commenced arbitration proceedings with SIAC to apply for the same facilities in the BVI courts. Despite the start of arbitration, Hualon continues to take further steps in the BVI legal process, including access to BVI court documents. At the end of March 2015, Marty asked the BVI courts for a summary statement of the merits of the case. The Singapore court also found that Haulon had nevertheless demonstrated an un regatta of intent, which could be accepted by Marty, although Haulon initiated arbitration proceedings before the summary judgment application had been filed. ”First of all, the Court`s argument that the opening of judicial proceedings is itself an apparent rejection of the arbitration agreement now seems to justify the weight of the justification of a judicial procedure for the party that initiates it. Therefore, a party who has legal proceedings for any reason in the face of an arbitration agreement, for example for the ancillary or temporary facility to support arbitration, should make his position regarding arbitration understood from the outset. This allows her to objectively prove that she had no negative intention at the opening of the proceedings. ”Once an offence has been committed, it persists and can be accepted until the breach of contract resumes the performance of the contract, thus ending the persistent right of the innocent party to accept rejection,” he said.